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Abstract - This assessment was initiated by the NASA 
Engineering & Safety Center (NESC) after a number of recent 
"high profile" connector problems, the most visible and 
publicized of these being the problem with the Space Shuttle's 
Engine Cut-Off System cryogenic feed-thru connector. The 
NESC commissioned a review of NASA's connector selection 
and application processes for space flight applications, including 
how lessons learned and past problem records are fed back into 
the processes to avoid recurring issues. Team members were 
primarily from the various NASA Centers and included 
connector and electrical parts specialists. 
The commissioned study was conducted on spacecraft connector 
selection and application processes at NASA Centers. The team 
also compared the NASA spacecraft connector selection and 
application process to the military process, identified recent high 
profile connector failures, and analyzed problem report data 
looking for trends and common occurrences. 
The team characterized NASA's connector problem experience 
into a list of top connector issues based on anecdotal evidence of 
a system's impact and commonality between Centers. These top 
issues are as follows, in no particular rank order: electrically 
shorted, bent and/or recessed contact pins, contact pin/socket 
contamination leading to electrically open or intermittencies, 
connector plating corrosion or corrosion of connector 
components, low or inadequate contact pin retention forces, 
contact crimp failures, unmated connectors and mis-wiring due 
to workmanship errors during installation or maintenance, loose 
connectors due to manufacturing defects such as wavy washer 
and worn bayonet retention, damaged connector elastomeric 
seals and cryogenic connector failure. 
A survey was also conducted of SAE Connector AE-8C1 
committee members regarding their experience relative to the 
NASA concerns on connectors. The most common responses in 
order of occurrence were contact retention, plating issues, worn-
out or damaged coupling mechanisms, bent pins, contact crimp 
barrel cracking and torn seals. In addition to these common 
themes, responses included issues with markings, dimensional 
errors on the build, contact/socket damage (handling), 
manufacturing defects and customer misapplication and 
mishandling. 
The NESC team concluded that considering the large quantity 
and wide variety of connectors successfully flown on human and 
robotic space applications, the number of failures is quite low. 
However, "high profile" failures with significant cost, schedule, 
safety, and/or mission success impacts continue to occur. It was 
also concluded that connector failures occur throughout a 
system's life-cycle with the majority of connector issues 
application related. A number of recommendations were
identified for improving NASA connector selection processes 
and overall space connector reliability and performance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This assessment was sponsored by the NASA Engineering & 
Safety Center (NESC). The NESC is an independently 
funded organization that provides objective engineering and 
safety assessments to NASA and collaborating organizations 
that support space based systems. This also includes 
conducting proactive investigations to identify and address 
potential concerns before they become major problems. 
Several factors led the NESC to commission an electrical 
space connector selection and lesson learned assessment. 
Initially, a NASA managed program developed out-of-
specification connector bonding resistances which were 
attributed to using electroless nickel plated aluminum 
electrical connectors. NASA has also recently experienced a 
number of "high profile" connector problems, the most 
visible and publicized of these being the problem with the 
Space Shuttle's external tank Main Engine Cut-Off System 
and specifically its cryogenic feed-thru connector which 
resulted in several cancelled launch attempts. This pointed to 
the need for a broader NESC review of the electrical 
connector selection and application processes for space flight 
applications, and how lessons learned and past problem 
records are incorporated to minimize the potential for 
recurrences. 
The objectives of this study were to review the space 
connector selection and application process, including the 
roles and responsibilities of government, contractors and 
subcontractors, the requirements approach, and to determine 
how lessons learned are incorporated. The intended goals are 
to determine if there is potential to improve NASA in the 
above areas either by direct NESC involvement or indirectly 
via recommendations to the NASA Office of Chief 
Engineers. A secondary and important goal is to disseminate 
findings and recommendations to the aerospace community. 
NESC team members who conducted the assessment were 
connector and electrical parts experts from the various NASA 
Centers and representatives from aerospace industry. 
Findings and recommendations of this project were provided 
to the NASA Office of Chief Engineers in an NESC 
published report entitled "Spacecraft Electrical Connector 
Selection and Application Process," NESC Request No: 08-
0048 1. The full report can be obtained from the NESC. This 
paper provides a summary of the NESC report. 
II.	 PRESENTING ISSUE 
This assessment was initiated after a NASA managed 
program developed out-of-specification bonding resistances 
attributed to using electroless nickel plated aluminum 
connectors. Gold-plated electrical connectors have typically 
been used in spacecraft applications to establish a low 
impedance contact with hardware chassis wire harness and 
Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) shielding. Connectors 
with electroless nickel plating have been widely used for 
many years. EM! bonding and grounding requirements 
typically define a maximum allowable resistance for the 
connector housing to wire harness shield or connector 
housing to chassis connection, as appropriate. Connector 
manufacturers use a variety of coatings/plating systems and 
processes to create a protective and highly conductive surface 
on the aluminum connector shell. 
Most space grade connectors are made of an aluminum alloy. 
Aluminum is a reactive metal with good corrosion resistance 
since it quickly forms a passivating oxide layer 1. The 
protective oxide is non-conductive. A conductive plating 
system is added to the aluminum surface so a low resistance 
electrical bond can be maintained between connector faying 
surfaces. A low resistance value of 2.5 milliohms or less is 
typically required to maintain acceptable connector electrical 
shielding and EM! requirements (i.e., MIL-C-38999,
paragraph 3.29 series 3 aluminum connectors). Common 
plating systems for space applications are gold and nickel. 
Both plating systems can provide good surface conductivity, 
but nickel provides limited corrosion protection compared to 
gold. Nickel is cathodic to aluminum and therefore, 
corrosion protection is accomplished by encapsulation of the 
substrate. As long as the nickel plating remains intact and the 
aluminum substrate is not exposed, substrate corrosion will 
not be an issue. Once the aluminum is exposed, the 
connector can be corroded in a moist environment. l'his 
results in a resistive coating that degrades EMI and electrical 
shielding/bonding properties. 
Electroless nickel plating systems are particularly susceptible 
to porosity and can be physically damaged (scratched) during 
connector installation and handling. In aviation, this has been 
a serious issue, leading military services to restrict electroless 
nickel aluminum connector usage (i.e., MIL-STD-l568, 
paragraph 5.10.3.5) during the 1988-89 timeframe. The 
primary issue was corrosion which caused connector damage 
on aircraft as a result of exposure to high humidity and salt 
water and/or due to handling-induced plating damage. This 
prohibition did not apply for spacecraft applications. For 
many years, the United States military and commercial 
aviation solution for aluminum connectors has been an 
electroplated nickel with a cadmium and chromate 
conversion coating. Cadmium and chromate act as sacrificial 
coatings and protect the aluminum substrate when the 
connector plating system is physically damaged. This system 
is not used for space applications since there is a concern 
with cadmium outgassing in space/vacuum environments. 
Recent environmental restrictions on cadmium and chromate 
use have resulted in new corrosion resistant plating systems 
being developed that meet electrical bonding and EM! 
shielding requirements. These new aluminum connector 
plating systems and plated composite connectors have been 
added to the most recent version of MIL-C-38999. 
In spacecraft applications, the consequences (e.g., risks) for 
these bonding resistance problems vary considerably. If 
connector bonding resistance exceeds the system requirement 
by less than an order of magnitude and appears stable, then a 
waiver typically is generated. Major risks could occur when 
the bonding resistance continues to increase over time, 
including electromagnetic emissions coupling to surrounding 
signals, or corrosion products on electrical contacts 
potentially creating electrical open circuits or high 
resistances. These more serious conditions have been 
observed when electroless nickel aluminum connectors are 
physically damaged or are stored with certain types of 
Ethylene-TetraFluoroEthylene (ETFE) wire insulation which 
can lead to corrosion. This is documented in the 
Government-Industry Date Exchange Program (GIDEP) 
Alert EA-P-98-02B "Wire Outgassing" issued in 1992 and 
NASA Goddard Advisory, NA-GSFC-2003-03 
"Fluoropolymer Degradation Resulting in Corrosion of 
Packaged Pre-wired Connector Assemblies" issued in 2003
(downloadable at http://nepp.nasa.gov/npsllwireiNA-GSFC-
2003-03.pdf). 
Electroless nickel coated aluminum connectors should not be 
used in areas exposed to humidity and salt water. Use should 
also be restricted in high maintenance areas where the nickel 
plating can be damaged, exposing the aluminum and leading 
to corrosion. As noted above, these connectors should also 
not be stored with fluorinated wire insulations known to 
outgas reactive fluorine. 
Electroless nickel connectors can perform well in space 
applications with appropriate cautions. An example is the 
International Space Station (ISS) which has a large number of 
electroless nickel connectors and has not experienced 
significant connector issues. Gold-plated aluminum 
connectors with a nickel barrier should be used when there 
are stringent EM! shielding requirements. Electroless nickel 
aluminum connector performance and specifically corrosion 
resistance can be improved by using enhanced manufacturing 
processes and the following handling guidelines: 
• Minimize surface roughness of the aluminum shell and 
clean surface prior to plating to promote good plating 
adhesion and reduce porosity. 
• Increase phosphorus content in the electroless nickel 
plating solution to hardness plating. Insure that other 
proprieties such as conductivity and porosity are not 
adversely affected. 
• Eliminate plating bath contaminates and replace aged 
solutions which will promote better corrosion resistance 
and plating adhesion. 
• Increase plating thickness, however, ensures that 
excessive plating does not create an adhesion issue. 
• Maintain connectors in a low moisture and non-corrosive 
environment during storage, installation and in 
operational use. 
• Use suitable type gloves when handling connectors. 
• Avoid damaging plating and exposing the aluminum 
substrate during storage, installation and operational use. 
• Inspect and replace or repair connectors with damaged 
plating during repair and modification procedures. 
Connector Selection Process 
Central to the electrical system of human and robotic 
spacecraft and launch vehicles is the wiring harness with 
electrical connectors that mate to various avionics boxes and 
interface panels as required by the overall electrical system 
design architecture. Inside avionics boxes circuit card 
assemblies may also interface to backplanes through blind 
mate card connectors. Specialized high voltage, radio 
frequency, ribbon cable, fiber optic, etc. connectors have
found use in flight applications. Spacecraft and launch 
vehicles interface to ground processing facilities typically 
through umbilical connectors that dc-mate prior to or during 
the launch sequence. The spacecraft electrical connector 
selection and application process and how field use 
experience feeds back into this process was the main focus of 
this assessment. 
Electrical connectors may be selected by an avionics box 
lead, mechanical design engineer, electrical design engineer, 
harness engineer, or system engineer, as will be described in 
more detail in subsequent sections. Additionally, a connector 
may be selected by a supplier during interface definition or 
even by default in case of an existing system built for 
previous missions. Factors such as hermeticity, shock and 
vibration tolerance, vacuum compatibility, out gassing and/or 
contamination, magnetic properties, EM! performance, size 
and weight, current and/or voltage capability, cost, and 
availability, are considerations for selection depending on the 
application. Connector choice can clearly impact multiple 
engineering disciplines through the entire mission life-cycle. 
The ideal spacecraft electrical connector selection and 
application process should have a "control system"-like 
feedback mechanism implemented to build upon anomalies 
experienced in field use and increased knowledge as shown 
in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Idealized electrical connector selection and 
application process 
However, upon review, the current NASA process followed 
the	 more	 nebulous	 route	 below 
in Figure 2. 
Typically an anomaly is discovered by a project/program and 
the resulting investigation is funded by that specific 
project/program. The project/program investigates to a level 
of root cause understanding sufficient to meet the 
project/program's needs.
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Figure 2. Actual NASA Connector Selection and 
Application Process 
There is a perception that many designers regard connectors 
as a well-debugged commodity with minimal failure modes. 
In reality, agency experience has shown that a connector is a 
complex system having many failure modes. Safe and 
reliable use of a connector requires close attention to its 
design and implementation in each application and 
environment to avoid each of the many failure modes. 
Most NASA missions produce one-of-a-kind or low volume 
space flight systems, although the Agency's Space Shuttle 
Orbiter and Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) are re-usable. 
Often spacecraft assembly and functional testing is performed 
in a "clean room" environment. Electrical connector mate 
and de-mate cycles are typically minimized, and logs of these 
mate and demate cycles may be maintained. Six NASA 
centers participated in this study, each with unique missions 
and in some cases different connector selection processes and 
methods of documenting and reporting connector failures. A 
listing of the participating NASA Centers and their mission 
with respect to connector selection and use is given in Table 
Table 1. Participating NASA Centers and Primary 
Mission
Marshal	 Flight Design center for propulsion and 
Space	 Center transportation systems such as the 
(MFSC)	 space shuttle and Ares rockets 
Review of Lessons Learned Databases 
As part of this study, the GIDEP Advisories and Alerts 
system was queried for connector related issues. NASA 
directs its Centers and flows down the requirement to its 
contractors to routinely review and, when appropriate, submit 
GIDEP Alerts and advisories. NASA also maintains a public 
and limited access Lessons Learned data base and a NASA 
Advisory system. 
The existing GIDEP (Governmentllndustry) process has 
multiple levels of reporting for parts and other problems: 
• Alert: A GIDEP document that reports a problem with 
parts, components, materials, specifications, software, 
manufacturing processes, or test equipment that can 
cause a functional failure. 
• Problem Advisory: A GIDEP document that reports a 
problem with parts, components, materials, 
manufacturing processes, specifications, software, 
manufacturing processes, or test equipment that has an 
unknown or low probability of causing problems for 
other users. 
• Agency Action Notice: A GIDEP document that 
redistributes problem information issued by a 
Government Agency to GIDEP participants. 
• Safe-Alert: A GIDEP document that reports a non-
conforming item, product, or situation that creates a 
safety hazard for personnel or equipment 
GIDEP databases, while beneficial, give only limited 
information and provide an incomplete picture of connector 
issues because manufacturers are often encouraged to write 
GIDEP Alerts on their own products. Consequently, these 
results often include positive "spins" and may omit details 
that could provide competitive advantages to other vendors. 
Also, NASA and many of its contractors use internal alert 
systems with restricted access so the information does not 
become widely known. NASA and its contractors are 
required to verify connector selection against GIDEP issues 
and submit issues to GIDEP; however submitting issues to 
GIDEP is not well enforced. 
As part of this study a GIDEP record search on "connector" 
was performed for the years 2002 through 2008. Forty-five 
records were returned, including GIDEP Alerts, Problem 
Advisories, Agency Action Notices, and GIDEP Lessons 
Learned over the seven-year period. Two NASA Advisories 
were issued during that period. Trending indicated a decrease 
in the rate of GIDEP records issued per year; see the lower 
plot ("GIDEP") in Figure 3 below. NASA connector 
discrepancies (data among four Centers) attributed to 
NASA Center Primary Mission 
Goddard	 Space Advanced instruments and spacecraft 
Flight	 Center for Earth-orbiting and other space 
(GSFC) missions. 
Johnson	 Space Design	 center	 for	 Space	 Shuttle, 
Center (JSC) International Space Station and Orion 
program 
Langley	 Research Aviation	 and	 supersonic	 aircraft 
Center (LaRC) development	 and	 test	 facility	 for 
space systems 
Kennedy	 Space Launch	 operations	 for	 NASA 
Center (KSC) programs and maintenance	 facility 
for the space shuttle 
Jet	 Propulsion	 Lab Develops and manages unmanned 
(JPL) planetary and deep space systems
connector manufacturer causes ("NASA") are trended in the 
upper plot of Figure 3. The difference between the slopes 
(0.76 and 0.83) is not significant, indicating similar reliability 
growth between "GIDEP" and NASA discrepancies. Thus, 
GIDEP records are, in fact, a representative "sample" of 
NASA connector occurrence rates. Trending results 
indicated nominal connector reliability improvement 
(growth) given the above assumptions. 
The quantity of reported connector problems show that 
NASA and its contractors only report a fraction (less than 
20%) of the problems encountered to GIDEP (see Figure 3 
below). If other government users and contractor's 
discrepancies were included in a similar analysis, GIDEP 
under-reporting would be much worse. 
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Figure 4. NASA Lessons Learned Pareto of Electrical 
Connectors. 
A key aspect of this assessment was the evaluation of the 
mechanisms NASA uses to learn from its mistakes. During 
this assessment, the NESC team looked for processes that 
would capture connector-related issues in design, 
manufacturing, installation, and application. More 
importantly, once captured, the team looked for processes 
that would add information in the most efficient and 
accessible way, to the collective knowledge of those working 
.,.,, with connector and wiring systems within the Agency and its 
partners (e.g., contractors and other organizations) nation and 
world-wide. 
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Figure 3. Connector GIDEP and NASA discrepancy 
trends for 2002 through 2008. Numbers above fit lines 
are slopes (13's). 
The Agency's present Lessons Learned approach is 
documented in NPR 7120.6 "Lessons Learned Process" dated 
March 22, 2005. A search for the term "connector" was 
entered into the existing online Lessons Learned searchable 
database at: httix//nen.nasa. gov/portallsite/llis/LIJ. Forty-six 
records resulted, and a summary of the distribution of these 
reports is shown in Figure 4. The mate and dc-mate 
condition (36% of write-ups) typically resulted in bent or 
recessed pins due to improper mating. Design issues in the 
form of misapplication or improper selection of the connector 
accounted for 23% of the write-ups. GSE accounted for 13% 
of the write-ups and primarily cited cases where arcing had 
occurred due to a short comidition or high voltage. Crimps 
accounted for 8% of write-ups and dealt with a loose or 
inadequate crimp connection. Cryogenics accounted for 5% 
of the write-ups and cited a buildup of a dielectric film at 
cryogenic temperatures.
Review of NASA Center Connector Issues: 
In order to assess connector selection and connector related 
failures participating NASA Centers were asked to discuss 
their connector selection and design processes and review 
their databases for connector related failures. A brief 
summary of representative Center reports follows: 
GSFC Projects and Programs provide advanced instruments 
and spacecraft for Earth-orbiting and other space missions. 
Many GSFC spacecraft are Earth-observing, others perform 
"outward looking" scientific measurements, and some 
provide exploratory deep space systems. Typically, GSFC 
missions follow a concept-design-build (fabrication)-
Integration and Test (I&T)-launch-operations phasing. 
Connector selection usually will occur early during the design 
phase and continue, along with procurements, during 
fabrication. 
Nearly seven hundred connector-related faults and failures 
(including some wire/wiring and fiber optics) were reported 
from three different GSFC databases and another non-
database/text source during 1999 - 2008. Most of the GSFC 
instruments and spacecraft are launched into Earth orbits or 
deep space; they are not subject to repair and maintenance 
(excepting the Hubble Space Telescope). Consequently,
most of the GSFC's connector-related faults and failures 
(-99%) occurred during ground processing prior to spacecraft 
launch. Only mile anomalies attributed to connectors 
occurred in operational phases ("on-orbit" or ground 
communications systems) and none resulted in mission 
failures. 
Connector problems classified by failure mode showed 719 
faults/failures among 605 connector events (some problems 
had more than one mode). Figure 5 presents these modes in a 
Pareto chart. The four left-most modes are associated with 
workmanship-induced defects and are grouped together; the 
remaining modes appear in the right hand grouping. 
Electrical high or low resistance connectors or contacts 
accounted for 1.8% and low pin retention force was 0.6%; 
neither is included in Figure 5. Faults or failures caused by 
process (failing to follow procedures or processes, improper 
paperwork) are not included in these failure mode counts. 
Of the 83 electrical faults/failures (shorted, open, or high or 
low electrical resistance) 20% exhibited intermittent electrical 
signatures. Faults or failures caused by process (failing to 
follow procedures or processes, improper paperwork) are not 
included in these failure mode counts. 
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Figure 5. Failure mode distribution of GSFC connector 
faults and failures. Four left hand bars are 
workmanship-related; right hand bars are other modes. 
A separate classification by fault/failure cause (workmanship, 
design, process, connector manufacturer fault, or human 
factor) involved 696 records among the above-cited data 
sources. A Pareto chart for the GSFC connector 
faults/failures by cause is shown as Figure 6. The 
percentages in Figure 6 have been adjusted for unknown 
causes (i.e., those for which discrepancy causes could not be 
discerned from the recorded description, which were 21%). 
Nearly 50% of all GSFC connector faults/failures were 
caused by workmanship errors. Design caused 16%, failure
to follow process or procedures or insufficient or erroneous 
paperwork (e.g., no certificate of compliance) accounted for 
16%, and human factors were at 1%. Faults/failures caused 
by connector manufacturer (CMfr) error or non-compliance 
accounted for 15%; of those manufacturer-caused events, 
26% were dimensional defects (i.e., out of specification), and 
74% were associated with manufacturer process or 
workmanship issues (plating, incorrect or missing parts, or 
other manufacturing-caused defects). 
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Figure 6. GSFC Connector Faults/Failures by Cause 
WK-Workmanship;	 DS-Design,	 PR—Procedure 
CMfr - Connector Manufacturer, and flU—Human Factor. 
Other classifications were "extrinsic" or "intrinsic;" where 
the reported component faults/failures were caused by a 
defect in the component itself (intrinsic) or by some external 
factor, such as an assembly or integration and test process or 
procedure error, design error, misapplication, or human factor 
causing the fault or failure (extrinsic). Only 19% of 
connector faults/failures were caused by a defective 
component (connector or wire); and 81% were caused by 
extrinsic factors. 
GSFC Data Review Summary: 
• Approximately 700 connector faults or failures were 
reported during 1999 to 2008. 
• No connector fault or failure caused a satellite or ground 
system operational failure. 
• Most connector faults/failures occurred during 
fabrication and testing, prior to launch. 
• Nearly two-thirds (64%) of all GSFC connector 
problems, faults, and failures were caused by 
workmanship and process/procedural issues. 
• The five most frequently occurring connector failure 
modes were: missing or incorrect hardware (16%), 
damaged or failed (11%), loose (9%), incorrectly wired 
(9%), not seated or mis-mated - including recessed 
sockets or pins (8%). Approximately 5% of GSFC
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connector faults/failures involved either corrosion or 
contamination and approximately 3% were related to 
bent pins. 
•	 Intermittent electrical faults/failures occurred in 20% of 
the electrical faultslfailures. 
• Connector problems, faults, and failures have been 
increasing at a greater rate, particularly during most of 
2002 and the last half of 2006, until November 2008. 
The system with the most extensive history of space flight is 
the Space Shuttle fleet; maintained and launched from KSC. 
The shuttle program has been in operation since 1981 and has 
completed over 127 space missions. Over this period there 
have been five Orbiters with two lost (one during the launch 
phase and the other during ascent). In supporting the NESC 
connector selection study, KSC mined connector anomalies 
from the parts database on the Space Shuttle. The data 
collected was from 1975 (includes test missions) to present 
and includes all elements in the Space Shuttle Program (SSP). 
Problem reports specific to connectors and terminations were 
reviewed for the Orbiters over this period and are 
summarized in Figures 7A and 7B. 
1._.__ It'u!IIIIlIEllHflHhI 
..iiIiIUUII illil liii 
liii 
' '!1i iii i II,I1 !rII ' ! iiiipkii III
- Btn —	 S	 On dLq -. FI P V.1 
Figure 7A. Orbiter Termination Discrepancies Summary 
1976 to Present
A portion of KSC connector discrepancies and faults were 
compiled and classified according to cause and failure mode 
in Figures 8 and 9. Thirty three percent of KSC connector 
discrepancies were attributed to connector manufacturer 
defects, 20% to workmanship and 16% to 
"process/procedure" (many of these later were associated 
with lot traceability and paperwork issues). No design causes 
were noted, consistent with the Program's mature life cycle. 
Figure 8. KSC Connector Anomalies by Cause 
(CMfr- Connector Manufacturer), WK- Workmanship, 
PR- Process/procedure discrepancy, and UKN-
Unknown. 
The most frequent connector failure modes were grommet 
defects (17.6%), damaged or failed connectors (17.2%), 
missing or incorrect connector parts (14.1%), loose 
connectors and associated fastening hardware (10.6%), 
unseated or mis-mated connectors and recessed pins or 
sockets (8.4%), and corrosion or contamination (8.4%). 
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Figure 9. KSC Connector Anomalies by Failure Mode. 
Figure 7B. Orbiter Connector Discrepancies Summary 
1976 to Present 
Throughout the 29 years of service, there have been 
significant types of connector anomalies observed that can be 
summarized as follows, not in any particular order:
38999 series 2 connector. The root cause was silicone 
contamination on the feed-through connector pins and 
sockets. The silicone contamination created a high resistance, 
resulting in an intermittent condition (Figure 10). 
• Tom connector grommets 
• Wrong size wavy washer installed 
• Elongated/double bayonet holes 
Connector threaded body sharp edges damaging wires 
• Silicon contamination on pins 
• Missing and damaged RFI springs 
• Missing and damaged bayonet pins 
• Sheared dog-ear locking tab causing loose back shell 
• Sheared and damaged insert locking tab 
• Feed-through connector inserts 180 degrees off 
• Terminal marking off for symmetrical insert arrangement 
• Oversized rear grommets/loose back shell 
• Marginal insert block bonding 
• Missing or damaged retention clips 
• Wrong mterfacial seal installed 
• Nick or cracked interfacial seal 
• Bent pins 
• Recessed sockets and/or pins 
• Miss-pin or cross wired connector 
The five most significant anomalies were errors during 
connector fabrication/build due to a combination of 
workmanship, inadequate process controls, and application. 
Some recent examples of the anomalies are (not in any 
particular order): 
• Bulkhead feed-through connector inserts 1 80 degrees off 
- causing bent pins and opens 
• Wing feed-through connector contamination causing 
intermittencies 
• Wrong wavy washer on connector Savers causing loose 
connector mating and replacement 
• Tom connector grommets requiring connector 
replacement 
• Oversized rear grommets and caused loose back shells 
• Umbilical connector data loss due to pin corrosion and 
contamination 
• Missing or partial installed connector snap ring insert 
retention 
For the wing feed-through connector the failure mode was 
intermittent data drop-out of the wing feed-through a MIL-C-
Consequently, a GIDEP Alert was generated. The connector 
vendor confirmed the origin of the silicone to be a result of a 
silicone bath the feed-through connectors were exposed to 
during manufacturing. Corrective actions were to add a spray 
bonded interfacial seal process and require a continuity check 
prior to use.
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Figure 10. Wing Feed-through Connector Contamination 
Numerous connectors have exhibited grommet damage 
during contact extraction/insertion, which requires connector 
replacement (Figure 11). Preliminary analysis found several 
possible causes including seal gland design, grommet 
elasticity, grommet hardness, and grommet material. 
Limiting reuse of connector extraction tools is also expected 
to reduce grommet damage. 
Figure 11. Torn grommet seal examples 
Analysis shows that the sharper seal design, coupled with the 
lower elasticity of the material may be responsible for the 
poor performance of the middle grommet design (see Figure 
12). This grommet design was also most likely to tear during 
insertion and extraction of contacts.
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Figure 12. Cross-sections of three manufacturer's 
grommet seals. The middle design was most likely to tear 
Four recent shuttle launches have been "scrubbed" on launch 
day after the main Engine Cut-Off (ECU) sensor produced 
anomalous readings; the last failure being in December 2007. 
The sensor system is one of several that protect the shuttle's 
main engines by triggering their shut down in the event fuel - 
either liquid hydrogen or liquid oxygen - levels in the 
external tank run low. When the fuel level drops below a 
sensor, the sensor resistance increases and the orbiter's 
computer reports the tank is "dry". Orbiter computers poil 
these sensors about every 10 seconds prior to planned Main 
Engine Cutoff which is about eight and half minutes after 
launch. If two of the four ECOs indicate "dry" the space 
shuttle main engines will immediately shut down. If the main 
engines are shut down prior to normal operating time, it could 
affect whether or not the shuttle reaches the appropriate orbit. 
The sensor system that has experienced anomalous readings 
is the Liquid Hydrogen (LH2) section of the External Tank 
(El). The failure could be the sensors, the wiring harness, 
one of several connectors or in the avionics box which 
monitors the sensor resistances. Resistance of the sensors is 
monitored through the wiring and connectors. The avionics 
sensor box in the orbiter sends data signals to the orbiter's 
onboard computer system. Sensor wires pass through a feed 
through connector in the side of the tank. The external cables 
run up the external tank vertical strut to the LH2 FT/Orbiter 
interface. There are four ECU sensors in the LH2 tank; 
mounted approximately four feet from the bottom of the tank. 
Similar ECU sensors are also located on the liquid oxygen 
tank. A schematic of the system is given in Figure 13. 
Once propellant loading begins, the LH2 ECU sensors will 
read 'wet,' indicating they are covered with cryogenic 
propellant. The sensors are monitored during tanking 
operations. During the December 2007 launch attempt two of 
the four LH2 tank ECO sensors gave false readings. NASA's 
launch commit criteria require three of the four sensors to be 
functional in order to lift off. A third sensor failed after the 
tank was drained of fuel. Within several hours of the tanking 
operation, all four ECU circuits returned correct readings.
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Figure 13. Overall schematic of the Engine Cutoff (ECO) 
system. The problem was isolated to the liquid hydrogen 
feed-through connector. 
When immersed in LH2 the sensor is "wet" and has a low 
resistance. Resistance at the avionics box includes the wiring 
and a "wet" sensor reading would be about 14 oluris. The 
sensor is "dry" when not immersed in LH2 and reads above 
50 ohms at the avionics box. The anomalous condition prior 
to several shuttle launches was a "dry" reading when the LH2 
tank was full. This indicates the sensor had failed open or 
there was an open in the wiring system. During the 
investigation of the unsuccessful Dec 2007 launch attempt the 
avionics box was ruled out as the source of the failure. 
Extensive fault isolation and ground testing confirmed the 
open occurred at the LH2 external tank feed-through 
connector (see Figure 14).
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Figure 14. ET Liquid Hydrogen Cryogenic Feed-through
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Figure 16.	 External tank feed-through connector 
soldered terminations 
Connector Survey Results 
and Mating Connectors and Pin Assignments 
Ground testing also revealed the pin and socket contacts 
would electrically open when the assembly was exposed to 
LH2. LH2 is approximately -423°F (-253°C) which is well 
below the operating capability of most materials. Removing 
the LH2 allowed the connector to warm up and continuity 
was re-established between the pin and socket contacts. 
Materials analysis revealed non-conductive contamination on 
the pin and sockets in the form of a grease and silicone oil 
(see Figure 15). It is also theorized that lateral pin movement 
occurs when the connector is exposed to LH2; reducing the 
contact area between the socket and pin. The failure cause 
was a combination of events; foremost being the feed-through 
connector was not designed to withstand LH2 cryogenic 
temperatures. Testing showed that a thin layer of frozen 
air/moisture forms on the pin/socket interfaces and pin 
movement occurs when the connector is exposed to LH2 (see 
Figure 15). Several years earlier the socket contact was also 
changed from a four tine to a two tine design. This made the 
socket/pin connection more susceptible to an open condition. 
In addition, non-conductive contamination reached the pins 
and sockets. Silicon oil contamination was most likely 
introduced during the connector manufacturing process and 
Krytoxx grease contamination during a procedure that applied 
grease to connector faces to improve the seal between the 
interfaces (Figure 15).
As part of this assessment, a survey was sent out to members 
of the AE-8C1 connector committee regarding connector 
failure modes and questions relevant to selecting space grade 
connectors. A total of thirteen responses were received. 
They included some of the largest aerospace connector 
suppliers and aerospace OEMs. The following is a summary 
of the general focus of the responses: Vendors and OEMs 
listed their top connector-related issues which in order of 
occurrence were contact retention, plating issues, worn-out or 
damaged coupling mechanisms, bent pins, contact crimp 
barrel cracking and torn seals. In addition to these common 
themes responses included issues with markings, dimensional 
errors on the build, contactlsocket damage (handling), 
manufacturing defects and customer misapplication and 
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Figure 15. Analysis revealed grease and silicone oil 
contamination on the feed-through connector sockets and 
pins. At L112 temperature a frozen layer of air forms; 
separating the pin and socket and resulting in an open 
condition. 
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to field issues. From the aerospace prime contractors, several 
referenced certification and internal lessons learned 
databases. GIDEP use was referred to in at least one case for 
"extreme or systemic cases". 
The solution to eliminating the loss of continuity between the 
pins/sockets at LH2 temperatures was to solder the pins and 
sockets (Figure 16). This was successfully used to solve a 
similar problem on the Delta/Atlas program. There have 
been no ECO system anomalies since the fix was 
implemented in the first half of 2008.
Regarding intermittencies and signal discontinuities, the 
majority of the responses suggested these occurred but most 
did not provide specific cases. Many suppliers performed 
discontinuity testing under a vibration environment that can 
result in signal drop-outs or opens. Interestingly, at least two 
of the connector manufacturers responded to the question on 
intermittencies with commentary on specific cases where 
their product was involved in an intermittent failure. In 
addition to these intermittency responses, a number of OEMs 
suggested that 100% testing of pin/contact retention prior to
final flight mate could reduce the occurrence of 
intermittencies. 
In one of the most interesting responses to the question of 
intermittencies, a large aerospace prime contractor 
discouraged NASA's practice of using D-subminiature (D-
sub) style connectors. The response effectively states 
NASA's growing trend in D-Sub use is in many cases a 
misapplication since requirements often exceed typical D-Sub 
capabilities. The responses notes the stamped shell with its 
floating contacts within the insert make it poor selection for 
most space applications despite is popularity. The suggested 
correction is the development and/or selection of more robust 
connectors that are more like typical Mil-Spec offerings, with 
a more modern high density design capable of meeting 
today's more stringent physical space requirements. 
Another company response suggested intermittencies can be 
caused by connector contacts not completely engaging. They 
specifically gave an example of using a bayonet type 
coupling with a large wire bundle that can partially pull apart 
contacts causing intermittency during vibration. Contact 
fretting corrosion (contact movement causes mechanical wear 
and material transfer at the surface, often followed by 
oxidation) or chattering during vibration were the most 
commonly suggested causes of "cannot duplicate" 
intermittency failures according to the manufacturers. 
Almost all companies recommended using electroless nickel 
plating for space grade connectors, indicating that it was a 
good compromise between design needs and cost from a 
supplier perspective. It was acknowledged that the choice of 
electroless nickel could be affected by design limitations such 
as surface conductivity, corrosion resistance, and Restriction 
of Hazardous Substances_(RoHS) compliance. Still, a 
number of companies suggested gold plating for higher 
conductivity, better EMI characteristics, and design 
compliance for space applications. Several OEMs noted 
electroless nickel is not appropriate for aircraft that are 
exposed to high humidity and salt water environments. 
Other companies recommended special handling and 
manufacturing procedures for electroless nickel. These 
included controlling surface condition of components and 
cleaning prior to coating/plating, ensuring the coating/plating 
is uniform, free of pits, rigorous control of deposition process 
and elimination of contaminants, use of low sheen types of 
coating/plating, and protecting against nicking or chipping of 
finishes. 
Most companies acknowledged the need to maintain a life 
time 2.5 milliohm resistance between connector shells. 
Suggestions for maintaining a good bonding interface 
included cleaning surfaces and using the same plating at the 
interfaces, using low fluorine cross-linked ETFE wiring and 
using gold-plated connector shells and mounting surfaces. 
In general, many vendors stated they offered a number of 
RoHS-compliant alternatives but one of the largest suppliers
noted m their response that recent discussion of eliminating 
nickel as a potential heavy metal contaminate presents 
significant challenges. RoHS complaint plating systems 
suggested included gold, zinc-nickel, Teflon®-nickel, pure 
aluminum, zinc-cobalt, and Alumiplate®. Several referenced 
the latest connector specification MIL-DTL-38999K that 
includes a number the above-mentioned RoHS compliant 
plating systems. It was mentioned that while pure aluminum 
finishes have good corrosion resistance, they do exhibit poor 
wear durability from galling. 
The industry was asked how NASA should communicate its 
connector requirements to manufacturers. Most responses 
emphasized tailoring existing standards through close 
communication with connector vendor application 
engineering groups. The most common response was that 
NASA should participate more fully in standards committees 
such as SAE and ARJNC and tailor these specifications for 
space applications. A common theme in the responses noted 
that the industry is familiar with military and industry 
standards and these should be used with NASA-specific 
modifications. 
Qualification by a third party lab prior to procurement for 
space grade parts was also common in a number of responses. 
One company stated that ordering space grade parts based on 
a company's specification sheet can result in receiving 
connectors that won't meet NASA out-gassing requirements. 
Another response suggested COTS connectors should be used 
only in benign and non-critical (i.e., low risk) areas. 
In one response, the submitter noted out-of-date qualified 
parts lists and suggested NASA modernize their parts plans 
with more current designs. The responder notes that the 
industry has advanced technologies in the connector arena but 
are "hamstrung by outdated sets of standards" from their 
NASA customer. 
Regarding composite connectors, three vendors offered part 
numbers for composite connectors in their lineup and a small 
number noted their parts were deployed in military aerospace 
applications. One vendor indicated they expected European 
Space Agency qualification for their composite connector by 
faIl 2009. Most advised that composite connectors should not 
be used in areas requiring high strength and/or extreme 
temperatures and suggested other notably heavier 
alternatives. 
On cryogenic connector offerings, most responses offered no 
off-the-shelf connector but several noted they had supplied 
cryogenic connectors on a custom basis. Interestingly, the 
vendor who supplied the Shuttle El feed-through connector 
stated that NASA had misapplied that connector in its 
(NASA's) cryogenic application. Further, that vendor, as 
well as a number of others pointed out that few if any 
connector makers have the ability to qualif' their parts in the 
cryogenic enviromnent beyond liquid nitrogen temperatures. 
One vendor suggests Elastomeric (silicone rubber) and
polymer materials for use above 200°C, or below -65°C, as a 
potential candidate for cryogenic applications. 
Top NASA Center Connector Issues 
Each NASA Center was requested to report the most 
common and high impact connector-related issues they 
experience. Reports were received from KSC, JSC. MFSC, 
GSFC LaRC, JPL and the NASA Lessons Learned Database. 
The following illustrates common themes and when possible, 
system examples of failures are provided and possible 
approaches to mitigate the failures. Issues are not ranked in 
order since not enough information was available to 
differentiate between the types of failures that were recorded. 
Shorted/bent contact pins or mis-mating were both reported 
by GSFC, KSC, JSC, the NASA Lesson Learned Database, 
and by industry responders to the connector questionnaire. 
This is one of the most serious failure conditions since it can 
lead to shorting and arcing when sufficient electrical power is 
available. Causes were due to improper installation by 
technicians (workmanship) and connector manufacturing 
defects where mated connector halves were misaligned. This 
failure condition was noted on several Space Shuttle 
bulkhead feed-through connectors (MIL-C-38999); failing 
continuity as a result of bent or crushed pins. The cause was 
improperly installed connector faces that were 180 degrees 
out of alignment. The corrective action was for the connector 
vendor to correct their manufacturing process and include a 
100% continuity check. In addition KSC now performs 
continuity prior to wire harness installation. Bent pins have 
also been caused by mis-mating connectors. This can be 
addressed by using scoop-proof connectors. This type of 
connector has the pins recessed so that when mating a 
connector it is aligned so the contact pins properly enter the 
appropriate sockets. 
Contact pin/socket contamination leading to open or 
intermittencies were reported by GSFC, KSC, JSC, MFSC, 
and the NASA Lesson Learned Database. Typically, 
contamination is attributed to silicone oil, a thin film build-up 
or a corrosion product. In some cases inadequate contact 
wiping action and retention was also noted. This failure 
condition typically occurs on multiple connections. An 
example of contamination is intermittent data drop-out of the 
wing feed-through connector (40M38277, NASA 
specification for circular space grade connectors) on the 
Space Shuttle. The root cause was silicone contamination on 
connector pin and sockets creating a high resistance and 
intermittency. A continuity check was added prior to 
connector use. Contamination on contact pins and sockets 
was also a factor in a recent Space Shuttle launch scrub-
related to an external tank feed-through connector. 
Connector plating corrosion or corrosion on connector 
components was reported by GSFC, JSC, MFSC, LaRC, and 
the connector questionnaire responders. Corrosion has led to 
loss of connector shell electhcal bonding (EM! shielding) or
electrical failures from the corrosion products shorting 
connector pins. This typically affects multiple connections 
and connectors. Several instances of connector corrosion 
were provided by GSFC that affected several satellite 
systems. In each case a high resistance bonding measurement 
was reported. One cause has been attributed to out-gassing of 
a corrosive compound from fluoropolymer wire insulation 
and damaged electroless nickel coating on aluminum 
connector shells. These issues can be addressed by avoiding 
damage to the electroless nickel coating and using low out-
gassing wire insulations. 
Low or inadequate contact pin retention forces were reported 
by GSFC, KSC, JSC, the NASA Lessons Learned Database 
and connector questionnaire responders. This typically 
impacted multiple connectors and created intermittencies. An 
example reported by GSFC affected a number of non-NASA 
satellite systems using the GSFC G08 style connector contact 
sockets (a tailored version of MIL-C-39029). The failure 
modes were electrical opens and intermittencies; the root 
cause was attributed to improper annealing of the contact 
socket material and oversized boring of sockets. Marginal 
sockets were identified by conducting retention tests. GSFC 
systems potentially affected required 100 percent screening 
for pin retention of GSFC's entire inventory showed no 
failures. Several OEMs also suggested 100% pin/contact 
retention testing prior to final flight mate to reduce 
intermittency occurrences. It is, however, more cost effective 
to perform a receiving pin retention screen because inspecting 
prior to final mate becomes a significant cost (and schedule) 
driver and some connectors may not be accessible. The 
receiving screen will be sufficient only if proper connector 
handling protocols are implemented to avoid subsequent 
damage during integration and testing. 
Contact crimp failures were reported by KSC, MSFC, the 
NASA Lessons Learned Database, and connector 
questionnaire responders. As an example, MSFC reported a 
group of electrical contacts built to the MSFC connector 
specification 40M38277 (NASA circular space grade 
connector) failed the crimp tensile test. Pull testing and other 
crimp integrity tests such as ultrasonic inspection have been 
found effective in identifying marginally crimped contacts. 
Unmated connectors and mis-wiring due to workmanship 
errors during installation or maintenance was reported by 
GSFC, KSC, LaRC and the NASA Lessons Learned 
Database. The NASA Lessons Learned Database contained 
several write-ups of connectors that were unmated or 
improperly mated due to a workmanship error. One example 
reported that after a launch, it was determined that a 
connector was not mated since an instrument was running 
hotter than normal. Connector mating verification was 
recommended. Using connectors with a visible mating and 
tactile indicator should also be considered. 
Loose connectors due to manufacturing defects such as a 
wavy washer and worn bayonet retention have been reported
by GSFC, KSC, LaRC, the NASA Lessons Learned 
Database, and the connector questionnaire responders. A de-
mated connector has also been attributed to connector 
manufacturing defects and worn engagement mechanisms. 
An example of this failure condition was a Space Shuttle 
connector saver that lost detent when axial force was applied 
and resulted in subsequent low detentlde-mates torque forces. 
Root cause was determined to be improper heat treating and 
the dimensional structure of the wavy washer that maintains 
engagement pressure. One solution is to use the series 3 style 
MIL-DLA-38999 connectors which have a more robust 
coupling mechanism. 
Damaged connector elastomeric seals were reported by KSC 
and the connector questionnaire responders. KSC has 
reported numerous connectors have had grommet damage 
during extraction and insertion, which required replacement. 
The root cause has been attributed to several conditions 
including seal gland design, dimensions out of specification, 
grommet elasticity, a grommet hardness, and grommet 
material. Replacing the tools more often or a redesign of the 
extraction tools is another consideration for reducing 
grommet damage. 
A cryogenic connector failure was reported by MSFC and the 
NASA Lessons Learned Database. The cryogenic related 
connector failure example from MSFC caused four launch 
scrubs of recent Space Shuttle missions. Root cause was 
isolated to the external tank feed-through connector. The 
connector socket and contact lost connection due to the 
sockets/pins containing non-conductive contamination and 
the sockets moving relative to the pins at cryogenic 
temperatures.
III.	 CONCLUSION 
Considering the large quantity and wide variety of connectors 
successfully flown on human and robotic space applications, 
the number of operational failures is quite low. However, 
"high profile" failures with significant cost, schedule, safety, 
andlor mission success impacts continue to occur (e.g., 
Shuttle ET ECO feed-through connector). Connector failures 
can affect multiple systems and may compromise system 
redundancy. Further, certain connector problems have 
continued to reoccur (e.g. contamination issues). Analysis of 
failure data also shows that the rate of connector problem 
occurrence is not decreasing over time. 
Connector failures occur throughout their life-cycle (design 
to field usage). Analysis on a data sample suggests that the 
majority of connector issues are caused by factors such as 
process or procedure errors, design, misapplication or human 
factors, rather than component intrinsic defects. Selecting a 
specific connector impacts multiple subsystems (e.g., 
mechanical, electrical, wiring) and systems engineering 
(redundancy and system performance), as well as sustaining 
engineering (e.g., installation, maintenance, ground 
operations, etc.). It is not evident that the connector selection
process adequately considers all subsystems and functions 
impacted. Nonetheless a significant number of failures (-64% 
from one data set) are not caused by the selection process. 
Manufacturing deficiencies and workmanship errors during 
installation caused the majority of these failures. 
The GIDEP database, while beneficial, gives limited 
information and provides an incomplete picture of connector 
issues. However, as manufacturers are often encouraged to 
write GIDEPs on their own products, the results often include 
positive "spins" and usually omit details that could provide 
competitive advantages to other vendors. Further, NASA, and 
many of its contractors, use internal alert systems that are 
generally access-restricted and thus, the information does not 
become widely known. NASA and Contractors are required 
to verify connector selection against GIDEP issues and 
submit issues to GIDEP; however, submitting issues to 
GIDEP is not enforced. 
Electroless nickel connector plating has experienced 
corrosion and flaking problems in aviation applications 
exacerbated by time, environment, and/or handling-induced 
damage. Electroless nickel connectors can perform well in 
space applications with appropriate cautions (i.e., ISS). 
Gold-plated aluminum connectors with a nickel barrier 
should be used when there are stringent EMI shielding 
requirements or for an extended exposure in atmospheric 
conditions. Electroless nickel aluminum connector 
performance and specifically corrosion resistance can be 
improved by using enhanced manufacturing processes and 
appropriate handling. 
Funding support for NASA space grade connector 
specifications and qualified supplier lists is inadequate to 
keep them current. Under Acquisition Reform (since 1994), 
many military specifications that NASA uses (including 
many connector type documents) have been cancelled and/or 
converted to industry documents (e.g. SAE, ASTM, NEMA, 
IPC, IEEE, etc.) leaving the user projects responsible for 
oversight. Critical quality and reliability decisions are being 
made by the responsible committees (i.e. SAE, ASTM, and 
NEMA), but NASA has lacked consistent participation in 
these committees. A review of two NASA connector 
specifications revealed many of the cited military and 
government specifications had been cancelled and converted 
to industry documents. 
NASA's connector problem experiences have been 
characterized into a list of top connector issues. Issues were 
selected based on anecdotal evidence of system impacts and 
commonality between Centers. The top issues are listed 
below in no particular rank order: 
. Electrically shorted, bent and/or recessed contact pins. 
• Contact pin/socket contamination leading to open or 
intermittencies.
• Connector plating corrosion or corrosion of connector 
components. 
• Low or inadequate contact pin retention forces. 
• Contact crimp failures. 
• Umnated connectors and mis-wiring during installation 
or maintenance. 
• Loose connectors due to manufacturing defects such as 
wavy washer and worn bayonet retention. 
• Damaged connector elastomeric seals. 
	
• Cryogenic	 connector	 failure. 
Recommendations for improving connector selection, 
reliability and overall integrity were provided to the NASA 
Office of Chief Engineers. A summary is given below: 
• NASA Centers should review existing NASA 
specifications, update active ones, cancel inactive and 
un-maintained ones, and remove references to cancelled 
specifications. 
• NASA Engineering organizations should investigate 
alternative connector shell plating systems and materials 
for space use. Several new connector shell materials are 
now available, which are RoHS compliant and offer 
improved performance over conventional connector shell 
materials. 
NASA Engineering organizations should include a 
systems engineering review of electrical connectors 
during spacecraft design and development phases. The 
systems engineering review should include (but not be 
limited to): system redundancy, cross discipline impacts, 
connector life cycle analysis, and human-system 
integration analysis (Including connector 
manufacturability, operability, and maintainability 
considering the workers and their work enviromnents). 
Systems engineering organizations should thoroughly 
review all Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) electrical 
connector applications. 
• Form a NASA wiring systems working group and more 
fully participate in the established Government 
Interagency wiring system working groups and SAE 
committees, specifically SAE AE-8A and AE-8C. 
Bibliography 
"Corrosion of Aluminum and Aluminum Alloys," 
ASM Metals Handbook Ninth Edition, Volume 13: 
Corrosion. 
Author Biographies:
Dr. Chris lannello began his career with 
NASA in 1989 as an intern in Ground 
-	 Power Systems. After obtaining his 
\',	 Bachelor of Science in Electrical 
Engineering (BSEE) in 1994, he began full-
time work as a NASA systems engineer 
focusing on both power and facility 
controlimonitoring systems. In 1998, Dr. Iannello's 
fellowship award allowed him to attend the University of 
Central Florida to pursue a doctorate in Electrical 
Engineering which focused on power electronics and 
Involved both R&D and teaching at the graduate level. After 
his return from academia, Dr. lannello, served as a key team 
member in developing the Kennedy Space Center's (KSC) 
basewide control system and developed and served as the 
project manager and engineer on a series energy/controls 
projects which became the largest in the history of the KSC 
saving in excess of $6 million annually. After completing 
these projects, Dr. Lannello was tasked with the analysis and 
simulation of a number of NASA most significant electronics 
issues including the Shuttle Engine Cutoff Sensor Avionics, 
the Hubble SM4 Power System Redesign, the Master Event 
Controller Spurious Output, and ISS Power Shutdown 
anomaly, as well as others. In 2007, Dr. lannello joined the 
Chief Engineer's Office as an Assistant to the Vehicle 
Processing Chief Engineer. In 2008, Dr. lannello was also 
named the Deputy Power Technical Fellow by the NASA 
Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). In 2009, his role in 
the Chief Engineer's Office was expanded and he now serves 
as the Deputy Chief Engineer for Ares, the senior technical 
position at the KSC for NASA's new manned rocket. He 
continues to work as a consultant on power electronics issues, 
is an invited session chair to the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Power Electronics conference, 
and has published over 20 publications in IEEE Conferences 
and Journals. 
Mitchell Davis 
Robert A. Kichak
George Slenski retired after 26 years of 
civil service based at United States Air 
l	 Research Laboratory's Materials 
l)trectorate. In his last assignment George 
was the Principal Technologist for the 
Electronic Materials Evaluation Group. He 
holds a Bachelor of Science in Electrical 
Engineering from the University of Florida and a Master of 
Science in Materials Engineering from the University of 
Dayton. George has conducted over 200 electronic failure 
analysis investigations on aircraft, spacecraft, and ground
based electronics, including mishap/accident investigations 
for the US Air Force, Navy, Army, NASA, FAA and NTSB. 
George is currently working as an independent consultant and 
is a member of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Power and Avionics Teams. He is also retained as a subject 
matter expert by the Naval Air Systems Command Wiring 
System Branch and Air Force Research Laboratory 
Electronic Materials Evaluation Group. He is a member of 
SAE AE-8A, AE-8C, and AE-8D committees. George is 
married with two daughters and lives in Dayton, OH.
